Fix potential integer overflow in TapSharedSendPacket#167
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lstipakov merged 1 commit intoOpenVPN:masterfrom Mar 19, 2024
Merged
Fix potential integer overflow in TapSharedSendPacket#167lstipakov merged 1 commit intoOpenVPN:masterfrom
lstipakov merged 1 commit intoOpenVPN:masterfrom
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Following code: unsigned int fullLength; <..> fullLength = PacketLength + PrefixLength; could cause integer overflow, which will result in allocation of smaller size of memory, which later causes buffer overflow and a bug check. Fix by checking overflow condition and fail the IRP in case of overflow. CVE: 2024-1305 Reported-by: Vladimir Tokarev <vtokarev@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Lev Stipakov <lev@openvpn.net>
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Looks good to me. ACK. |
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Following code:
unsigned int fullLength;
<..>
fullLength = PacketLength + PrefixLength;
could cause integer overflow, which will result in allocation of smaller size of memory, which later causes buffer overflow and a bug check.
Fix by checking overflow condition and fail the IRP in case of overflow.
CVE: 2024-1305
Reported-by: Vladimir Tokarev vtokarev@microsoft.com