This document describes how to audit, test, and validate the security properties of Vix.cpp. It is primarily intended for maintainers and core contributors.
The goal is to ensure that every release of Vix.cpp remains safe, robust, and predictable under real-world conditions.
Security in Vix.cpp is based on defensive engineering practices, not on custom or opaque security layers.
The project relies on:
- Modern C++ memory safety patterns (RAII, clear ownership)
- Compiler-based runtime checks (sanitizers)
- Static analysis tools
- Careful validation of external inputs
- Continuous testing and review
There is no custom security framework inside Vix.cpp.
All security testing relies on standard, well-known tooling.
Sanitizers are the primary security signal during development.
- AddressSanitizer (ASan)
- UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer (UBSan)
- ThreadSanitizer (TSan, when applicable)
cmake -S . -B build-san \
-DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Debug \
-DVIX_ENABLE_SANITIZERS=ON
cmake --build build-san -jRun the CLI or examples:
cd build-san
./vix --helpAny sanitizer finding must be treated as a blocking error.
The Vix CLI is part of the attack surface and must be tested accordingly.
Recommended checks:
vix check .
vix check main.cpp
vix run main.cpp --san
vix testsVerify that:
- Invalid inputs do not crash the CLI
- Errors are reported clearly
- Exit codes are consistent
- No undefined behavior occurs under sanitizers
Static analysis complements runtime checks.
cmake -S . -B build -DCMAKE_EXPORT_COMPILE_COMMANDS=ON
clang-tidy -p build $(find . -name '*.cpp')Focus areas:
- Undefined behavior warnings
- Lifetime and ownership issues
- Dangerous casts and conversions
cppcheck --enable=all --std=c++20 --inconclusive --quiet .Fuzz testing is optional but recommended for parsers and protocol boundaries.
Vix.cpp does not provide built-in fuzz targets. Contributors may create standalone fuzz harnesses using LLVM libFuzzer.
Example structure:
extern "C" int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t* data, size_t size) {
// Feed arbitrary input into parsing or decoding logic
// Ensure no crashes, UB, or infinite loops
return 0;
}Build and run:
clang++ -fsanitize=fuzzer,address,undefined fuzz_target.cpp -o fuzz_target
./fuzz_targetAny crash or sanitizer report is considered a security defect.
All security-related fixes must include regression tests.
Guidelines:
- Tests must fail before the fix
- Tests must pass after the fix
- Prefer minimal reproductions
Run the test suite:
ctest --output-on-failureRelease builds should enable standard hardening flags.
Recommended flags:
-fstack-protector-strong
-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2
-fno-omit-frame-pointer
Example:
cmake -S . -B build-rel \
-DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release \
-DCMAKE_CXX_FLAGS="-fstack-protector-strong -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2"Valgrind can be used as a secondary memory diagnostic tool:
valgrind --leak-check=full ./build-rel/vixExpected result:
- No invalid reads or writes
- No definitely lost memory
| Test Type | Recommended Frequency |
|---|---|
| Unit tests | Every commit / PR |
| Sanitizers | Before every release |
| Static analysis | Regularly or via CI |
| Fuzz testing | Before large refactors |
| Valgrind | Optional, targeted checks |
Security in Vix.cpp is ensured through:
- Compiler-based runtime checks
- Strict testing discipline
- Standard and transparent tooling
- Clear failure semantics
Every release must pass sanitizers, tests, and static analysis before being considered stable.
Maintained by the Vix.cpp maintainers
Contact: gaspardkirira@outlook.com